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WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION
HANS BREMS
Abstract
Monetarist and New Classical writers rarely
mention their production function, let alone its
functional form. The present paper specifies the
empirically robust Cobb-Douglas form, derives a
very elastic demand for labor from it, and sees
the result within the framework of a Friedman
"natural" rate of unemployment. The model is
solved for its employment, real wage rate, physi-
cal output, distributive shares, and its nominal
income, wage rate, and price. The algebra is
remarkably simple: all elasticities of solutions
with respect to policy instruments are constant.
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1 . Introduction
Consider a short-run static model of a private and closed economy.
Macroeconoraic theory, in effect, imagines such an economy producing a
single good: physical output and its price are then well-defined and
tractable variables. But even with a single good we must be careful
with our aggregation. An aggregate demand for labor must be explicitly
derived from firm demand for labor. Firm demand for labor must be
explicitly derived from the production function faced by the firm, and
so must an aggregate production function. We derive all of them from
the empirically robust Cobb-Douglas production function, find the
demand for labor to be very elastic with respect to the real wage
rate, and see our results in a Friedman framework of a "natural" rate.
We solve the resulting model for its employment, real wage rate,
physical output, distributive shares, and its nominal income, wage
rate, and price. To our delight the sensitivities of such solutions
to the policy instruments of the model may be measured by constant
elasticities
.
We use the following variables and parameters.
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2. Variables
< = physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L = labor employed
P = price
W = money wage bill
w = money wage rate
X = physical output
Y = money national income
Z = money profits bill
3. Parameters
a = joint factor productivity
a = elasticity of physical output with respect to labor
8 = elasticity of physical output with respect to capital stock
F = available labor force
X 5 fraction of available labor force employed
M = supply of money
S = physical capital stock
V = velocity of money
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4. National Income and Output
Money national income defined as the aggregate earnings arising
from current production is identically equal to national product de-
fined as the market value of physical output:
Y = PX (1)
5. Demand for Labor
We must be careful with our aggregation and begin at the firm
level. Let the inputs of the ith firm be L. and S. and its output ber l l ^
X.. Then under a Cobb-Douglas production function common to all firms
the output of the ith firm will be
X. = aL.V 6 (2)
l li
where 0<a< 1, 0< 8 < 1, a+ 6= 1, and a is what growth measure-
ment [Maddison (1987: 658)] calls "joint factor productivity."
Maximizing its profits the ith firm will hire labor until the last
man costs as much as he contributes. Under pure competition, then,
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the real wage rate will equal the physical marginal productivity of
labor:
w ax. . _ x.
i . a - 1_ l ._.
— = = aaL. S. = a — (3)
P 3L.
1 X
L.
l l
Here, as assumed, a - 1 = -0, so raise both sides of (3) to the
power -1/6, rearrange, and write firm demand for labor as an explicit
function of the real wage rate:
-1/0
w
L = (aa) 1/6 (-) S (4)
P
Write (4) for the jth firm, divide the result by (4) for the ith
firm, and find
L./L. = S./S. = s.
L. = L.s.
J i J
S. = S.s.
J i J
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where s. is a positive proper or improper fraction measuring the scale
of the jth firm relative to that of the ith firm. The Cobb-Douglas
production function (2), common to all firms, may then be written out
for each of them, j = 1 ... n, recalling that a + 8 = 1:
X. = aL. S. = a(L.s.) (S.s,) = aL. S. s,
1 11 1111 ill
X = aL S = a(L,s ) (S.s ) = aL. S. s
n nn in in lin
Add the n outputs, j 1 ... n:
X. + ... + X = aL.
a
S.
B
(s. + ... + s )
1 n l l 1 n
a[L.(s. + ... + s )]
a [S.(s. + ... + s )
l i nil n
a(L. + ... + L )
a
(S. + ... + S )
1 n 1 n
Defining aggregate employment, capital stock, and output
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L. + ... + L = L
1 n
s. + ... + s = s
1 n
X, + ... + X = X
1 n
we aggregate our Cobb-Douglas production function (2) for i = 1 ... n
into
X = aL
a
S
8
(5)
and our firm demand for labor function (4) for i = 1 ... n into
-1/8
i
l /ft
w
L = (aa) 1/0 (-) S (6)
whose real-wage-rate elasticity is seen to be:
31og L 1
= ~ - (7)
Slog (w/P) 6
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A realistic value of 6 would be 1/4, so the real-wage-rate
elasticity of the demand for labor would be -4. As shown in our
appendix, contained in the logarithmic definition of the elasticity
(7) is the better known definition of it as the percentage change in a
dependent variable L for a given percentage change in an independent
variable w/P. In plainer words, then, reducing the real wage rate w/P
by one percent would raise aggregate demand for labor by four percent.
Inherent in our empirically robust Cobb-Douglas function (5) is a
unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Demand
for good substitutes can be expected to be elastic—as we have found.
6. Solution for Employment
Current labor-market literature, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (1986)
and Blanchard and Summers (1988) distinguish between "insiders," who
are employed hence decision-making, and "outsiders," who are unemployed
hence disenfranchised. Facing our demand (6) the decision-making in-
siders can have a higher real wage rate for themselves by accepting
less employment of the disenfranchised outsiders. The resulting unem-
ployment is involuntary to the outsiders but voluntary to the insiders,
who accept it with the better conscience the more generous the unem-
ployment insurance benefits [Casson (1984)]—and the more unemployment
is perceived to be Keynesian!
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TABLE I. UNION DENSITY
Union Proportion of Nonagricultural Employees, 1984-1985
Low Medium High
0-30 30-45 45-100
U.S.
France
Japan
Switzerland
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
U.K.
Sweden
Source.- Freeman (1988: 69).
TABLE II. MILITANCY
Working Days Lost Per 1,000 Employees, Annual Average 1977-1986
Low Medium High
0-50 50-175 175-1,000
U.S.
U.K.
Italy
Source; IoL 3 Q.
Switzerland Germany
Japan France
Netherlands Sweden
LOW
0-4
TABLE III. UNEMPLOYMENT
Unemployment Rates, National Definitions, 1986
Medium High
4-11 11-14
Switzerland
Sweden
Japan
U.So
Germany
France
Italy
U.K.
Netherlands
Source: 0.E.C.D o
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Everything taken into account, let insiders accept the fraction
X employed of available labor force, where < X _< 1 . In other words,
if L > XF insiders will insist on a higher real wage rate. If
L = XF (8)
they will be happy with the existing real wage rate. If L < XF they
will settle for a lower real wage rate.
Consider the fraction X a parameter, then (8) will be a solution
for employment corresponding to Friedman's (1968: 8) "natural" rate
of unemployment. The fraction X must reflect institutional dimensions
of the labor market. In a nonunionized labor market, for example, the
real wage rate would simply be an equilibrating variable clearing the
labor market, hence the natural rate of employment would be at its
upper limit X = 1. It would be the lower, i.e., unemployment 1 - X
be the higher, the more unionized the labor market is and the more
militant its unions are. Or would it?
Tables I-III classify nine advanced economies as "low," "medium,"
or "high" in each of three dimensions of their labor markets: union
density, militancy, and unemployment. The brackets of each dimension
were defined such that groups of three economies would occupy each
bracket. Within each bracket the group was arranged in ascending
order of the dimension in question.
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Four of the nine economies display full correlation between
union density, militancy, and unemployment in the sense that the
economy occupies the same bracket in all three dimensions: Japan
always the lower bracket, Germany always the medium bracket, and
Italy and the U.K. always the higher bracket.
Six of the nine economies display correlation between militancy
and unemployment in the sense that the economy occupies the same
bracket in these two dimensions: Japan and Switzerland the lower
bracket, France and Germany the medium bracket, and Italy and the
U.K. the higher bracket.
Three economies display no correlation at all: the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the U.S. all manage to occupy at the same time three
different brackets in the three dimensions.
7. Solution for the Real Wage Rate
Raise (6) to the power -8, insert (8), rearrange, and solve for
the real wage rate
- = aa(XF)" SS 8 (9)
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What is the implied slope of the Phillips curve? The solution (9)
was found by inserting (8), hence is the real wage rate insiders will
be happy with, given their natural rate of employment X. As long as
the ratio w/P satisfies (9) the levels of the money wage rate w and
price P can be anything: the Phillips curve is vertical.
But can labor negotiate real rather than money wages? Under
indexation it can, and contract periods may be long. Where indexation
is illegal, not practiced, or practiced incompletely, shorter contract
periods will have to do. Then a temporarily finite slope of the
Phillips curve is possible. For example, let the monetary authorities
expand the money supply, thus stimulating demand, and let price re-
spond more readily than does the money wage rate. Then firms will
experience a temporary reduction of the real wage rate, temporarily
reducing the actual rate of unemployment below its natural rate. But
at the next round of collective bargaining, labor will restore the
original real wage rate (9) and with it, a Friedman natural rate of
unemployment 1 - X. Repeated attempts by government to apply
Keynesian instruments to non-Keynesian unemployment will fail:
instead of a long-run reduction of unemployment, they merely generate
successive rounds of inflation.
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8. Solution for Physical Output
Insert (8) into (5) and solve for physical output
X = a(XF) a S 6 (10)
9. Solutions for Distributive Shares
Once again we must be careful with our aggregation and begin at
the firm level. In (3) multiply by PL. and define the wage bill of
the ith firm
W. = wL. = ctPX.ill
Summing over n firms define
n
z w. = w
1-1
x
and find aggregate wage bill
W = aPX
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Finally use (1) to write labor's share
W
- = a (11)
Y
Define physical marginal productivity of capital stock.
9X X.
K = _± „ aBL «S. B " l = B-^
9S.
1 X
S,
l l
Multiply by PS. and define the profits bill of the ith firm
Z. = kPS. = BPX.ill
Summing over n firms define
n
z z. = z
i-1
x
and find aggregate profits bill
Z = SPX
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Finally use (1) to write capital's share
Z
- = 8 (12)
Y
10. Solutions for Levels of Nominal Variables
So far, like Walras, we have written a system (1) through (12)
which is homogeneous of degree zero in its nominal variables, hence
cannot determine their levels P, w, and Y. To determine such levels
we must, first, define the velocity of money as the number of times
per year a stock, of money transacts money national income:
Y e MV (13)
and, second, consider the money supply M and the velocity V to be
parameters. In that case (13) has trapped the level of money national
income Y and is a solution for it.
Insert (8) and (13) into (11) and solve for the level of the money
wage rate
-16-
MV
w = a — (14)
XF
Insert (1) and (10) into (13) and solve for the level of price
MV
P * JTa (15)
a(XF) aS 6
11. Elasticities
Let us examine the sensitivities of our solutions (8) through (15)
to the two policy instruments X and M.
We couldn't wish for a simpler measure of such sensitivities than
the constant elasticities displayed by the log-linear form of our
solutions. An elasticity is defined as the partial derivative of the
natural logarithm of a solution with respect to the natural logarithm
of a parameter. So we take natural logarithms of all solutions and
then differentiate them partially with respect to log X and log M:
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Slog L
°e
31og X
= 1 (16)
Slog L
°e
31og M
(17)
31og (w/P)
e
Slog X
-6 (13)
31og
e
(w/P)
31og M
= (19)
3log X
°e
3log
e
X
= a (20)
3log X
°e
31og M
e
= (21)
31og
e
(W/Y)
31og
e
X
- (22)
31og
e
(W/Y)
31og M
°e
= (23)
3log
e
(Z/Y)
3log
e
X
= (24)
3log
e
(Z/Y)
31og M
°e
= (25)
31og Y
Slog X
e
= (26)
31og Y
31og M
= 1 (27)
Slog w
e_
31og X
= -1 (28)
Slog w
Slog M
- 1 (29)
Slog P
Slog X
=
-a (30)
Slog P
°e
Slog M
= 1 (31)
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12. Summary of Findings
Of our sixteen elasticities half are zero, but zeros are also
interesting. Across countries and over time, growth measurement
[Denison (1967: 42) and (1974: 260)] found distributive shares re-
markably constant. In good accordance our elasticities (22) through
(25) are zero: our distributive shares are affected by neither the
natural rate of employment nor the supply of money. In good accord-
ance with monetarist doctrine [Friedman (1968)] our elasticities (17),
(19) , and (21) are zero: real variables are not affected by the money
supply.
As for our nonzero elasticities we use a = 3/4 and 8 = 1/4 and
summarize our findings as follows.
Reducing the natural rate of employment X by one percent would,
in (16), reduce employment L by one percent; in (18) raise the real
wage rate w/P by 1/4 percent; in (20) reduce physical output X by 3/4
percent; in (28) raise the money wage rate w by one percent; and in
(30) raise price P by 3/4 percent.
Expanding the money supply M by one percent would, in (27), (29),
and (31) raise money national income Y, the money wage rate w, and
price P by one percent—as Hume [1752 (1875: 333)] said it would!
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13. The Long Run
Our static elasticity (7) was a partial derivative, meaning that
everything else in (6) was being kept constant such as the joint fac-
tor productivity a, the elasticities a and 8, and the physical capital
stock S. Our short-run static model indeed kept them constant. In
long-run U.S. growth they have not remained constant. Can our static
elasticity (7) find its place in such a growth context, and is it con-
sistent with stylized facts?
Define the proportionate rate of growth of a variable v as the
derivative of its logarithm with respect to time:
dlog v
g
v
~=
e
~ (32)
dt
Then take the logarithm of (6). Consider the joint factor produc-
tivity a, the real wage rate w/P, and physical capital stock S func-
tions of time but consider the elasticities a and 3 stationary,
i.e., having zero growth rates. Differentiate the logarithm of (6)
with respect to time, use (32), and find
-20-
gL
=
" g
a
" ~ gw/P
+ SS
(33)
Stylized facts of long-run U.S. growth are
g = 0.015
g /„ = °- 025w/P
g
s
- 0.03
Into (33) insert these stylized facts along with our 8 = 1/4 and
find g = 0.01—another stylized fact of long-run U.S. growth. Thus our
static elasticity (7) has found its place in a growth context and is
consistent with stylized facts.
All a crude two-dimensional time-series approach would see was
that for a century the real wage rate was growing twice as rapidly as
employment—a positive correlation between g , p and gT ! More sophis-
ticated multi-dimensional time-series approaches such as those by
Yndgaard (1982) for one economy, Symons-Layard (1984) for six econ-
omies, and Klodt (1986) for 19 economies saw nothing but negative wage
elasticities of employment—but none quite as negative as our uncom-
promising static elasticity (7).
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14. The Rate of Interest
We have managed to do without a rate of interest, without a pro-
pensity to consume or save, and without a distinction between consump-
tion and investment. The underlying tacit assumption was a well-
functioning capital market in which a flexible rate of interest would
be the equilibrating variable between saving and investment. In that
case the propensities to consume or save would be of no direct conse-
quence for the aggregate demand for our single good. A higher pro-
pensity to save would simply reduce one use, i.e., consumption, of the
single good but expand another, i.e., investment, by as much—as
Smith 1 [1776 (1805: 78-79)] and Ricardo 2 (1951, IV: 179-180) said
it would. The New Classical economics is indeed classical!
In the long run there would be important indirect consequences
for physical product in the form of capital widening, deepening, or
quickening—beyond reach of our short-run model.
15. Disaggregation
We have cultivated the abstraction of an economy producing a
single good sold at price P by firms applying a common production
function and employing a single kind of labor at the common money wage
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rate w. The resulting macroeconoraic labor market, we found, might not
clear.
Turning to microeconomics we find a reality displaying all sorts
of wage differentials: wage differentials between industries, be-
tween firms in the same industry, between skilled and unskilled labor,
between male and female labor. Unions in Europe and minimum-wage
legislation in the United States try to narrow such wage differen-
tials .
As a result, microeconomic labor markets may not clear either.
As economists know, in the short run such narrowing will generate
excess demand for labor priced too low. The symptom is wage drift.
The narrowing will generate excess supply of labor priced too high.
The symptom is chronic unemployment of, say, the dropouts or the
elderly. In the long run, wage differentials too narrow to reflect
differences in skill and education will reduce the incentives to
acquire such skill and education.
-23-
FOOTNOTES
"Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital,
and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of
productive hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it
to him for an interest...
"What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is
annually spent, and nearly in the same time too; but it is consumed
by a different set of people."
2
"There is ... no danger that ... accumulated capital ... would
not find employment. ... There are always to be found in a great
country, a sufficient number of responsible persons, with the requi-
site skill, ready to employ the accumulated capital of others, and to
pay them a share of the profits, and which, in all countries, is known
by the name of interest for borrowed money."
-24-
APPENDIX. THE DEFINITION OF ELASTICITY
Contained in the logarithmic definition of an elasticity as
dlog y/dlog x is the better known definition of it as (dy/dx)(x/y) or
the percentage change in a dependent variable y for a given percentage
change in an independent variable x. That one is contained in the
other is easily shown.
Let all logarithms be natural ones. Let x = e and y = e . Then
log x = u and log y = v. Use the chain rule
e e
dlog y dv dv dy dx
dlog x du dy dx du
But dy/dv = de /dv = e = y, so its reciprocal dv/dy = 1/y. And
dx/du = de /du = e = x. Insert and find
dlog y dy x
dlog x dx y
so one definition is contained in the other,
-25-
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WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: NONPURE COMPETITION
HANS BREMS
Let all firms be producing the same good and selling it at the common
price P. But let the ith firm be large enough to affect that price:
P =mX. n
whose constant elasticity > n > - 1 is the reciprocal of the price elas-
ticity of demand and is common to all firms. Define gross profits as
Z. = PX. - wL.1 1
and maximize it with respect to employment L .
:
3Z. 3X. 3P 3X. ax
— = P -— + X - -= - w = (1 + Tl)P —- - w = 0;
3L. 3L. 3X. 3L. 3L.1111 i
w 3X.
— = (L + n) —
-
p 3L.
l
to be used instead of (3) on Page 5. Differentiate, raise to power -1/3.
rearrange, aggregate over firms, and find aggregate demand for labor
-1/3
I
p
i /r w
L = [aa(l -f n)]
1/P (-) S
to be used instead of (6) on Page 7. The real-wage-rate elasticity of
aggregate demand for labor is still -1/3-
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